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Introduction 
Between 1967 and 1974, rapid increases in farm commodity prices together 
with increases in food manufacturing and distribution costs have caused the consumer 
price index for food to increase by 61.7 percent. Consumer interest groups and 
others have argued that increases in the price of corn, wheat, and other grains 
cause inflation when higher grain prices result in higher retail meat, poultry, 
and processed grain prices. Livestock farmers and their suppliers also argue 
that erratic grain prices cause planning errors, unexpected losses, and increases 
in production costs. Because of these economic disadvantages, these and other 
groups have demanded trade agreement policies which might stabilize export demand 
and cash grain prices. 
Although changes in export demand influence grain and retail prices in the 
United States, other economic and environmental factors are of equal importance. 
For example, unexpected changes in weather conditions and input prices 
(fertilizers, petroleum products, etc.) cause grain supplies and prices to change. 
Variations in domestic feed demands, accounting for about 70 percent of the 
total demand, have a major influence on grain prices, once the new marketing year 
conunences. Finally, erratic changes in government policies such as the introduction 
of embargoes, import restrictions, and dollar devaluations also unexpectedly 
influence grain price changes. Because many factors influence grain and retail 
prices, some have argued that the introduction of trade agreements would not 
necessarily stabilize grain prices. 
These groups further rationalized that trade agreements are but a form of 
trade restriction and that trade restrictions are neither desirable nor an 
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effective means of providing a least cost marketing alternative. Most trade 
restrictions have been initiated as a barrier to free and open trade rather than 
as an encouragement for more efficient price determination. Thus, these people 
view trade agreements as an innocent-looking device which will grow and mature 
into a complicated trade barrier mechanism. 
Export Trends 
To more fully understand the importance of changes in export demand on U.S. 
grain prices, the following factors are examined: the annual U.S. supply of corn 
and wheat, percent of corn and wheat exported, the volume of grain moving to each 
destination, and the annual variations in exports to each destination. Since the 
U.S. share of the world grain market has varied from 31% in 1950-54 to 52% in 
1975, U.S. grain producers, livestock producers and consumers are affected by 
world supply and demand conditions. Changes in the U.S. corn and wheat export 
markets are highlighted in Tables 1 and 2. Export trends for these commodities 
characterize tren•. ,. that are occurring for other types of feed and food grains. 
U.S. corn ex· Jrts more than doubled between 1969 and 1975. Exports as.a 
percent of production increased steadily from 11.7 percent to 24 percent (Table 
1). Relatively high income countries, which feed corn to livestock, have been the 
primary recipients of the corn exports. Approximately 50 percent of all corn 
shipments have moved to Western Europe. Since transhipments through Canada 
have not been deleted, corn exports to Western Europe are underestimated, and 
shipments to America are inflated. Japan was the major importer of corn in 
Asia. Countries located in Eastern Europe have received .corn on a continual basis, 
while the USSR and mainland China have received corn only in recent years. 
Although annual exports to the USSR have varied, the major change occurred after 
the dollar devaluations in 1971 and 1973. Similarly, other importers also 
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increased their annual imports after the devaluations. For example, shipments 
to Europe, Asia, and to others increased by 46 percent, 120.6 percent and 172.7 
percent respectively (Table 1). The initiation of shipments to China by the U.S. 
are a result of easing political tensions and the removal of embargoes. 
The U.S. wheat exports have also more than doubled, and exports as a 
percent of production have varied from 38.4 percent to 77 percent (Table 2). 
Since wheat is a food grain and a relatively cheap source of protein, each year 
over 50 percent of the total exports moved to the Asian continent. Although 
Japan imported large quantities of wheat, very large quantities were also imported 
by low income countries. Wheat shipments to Western Europe were again understated, 
and were relatively small. Since 1970, countries in Eastern Europe received 
wheat from the U.S. on a continual basis. In order to meet its specified (planned) 
internal demands, the USSR has supplemented its domestic wheat supply by buying 
wheat from the U.S. on a sporadic basis. Again, the major change occurred after 
the 1971 and 1973 dollar devaluations. After the initiation of the 1972 grain 
trade agreement, it became politically acceptable to sell grain to the USSR. 
The political and economical environment also changed in 1973 permitting Mainland 
China to enter the wheat market. 
Variation in exports obviously affect short-run price trends in the U.S. 
Rapid increases in export volumes result in higher farm and food prices, while 
export reductions dampen farm prices, in particular. Export volume fluctuations 
in the 1970's are the result of changes in both world supply and demand conditions. 
Most of the supply changes were caused by variations in weather. The demand 
changes were caused in part by the devaluation of the dollar. This policy change 
has the effect of reducing prices to foreign buyers who in turn bought larger 
volumes of U.S. grain. 
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Issues Leading to Trade Agreements 
The discussion relating to grain exports is quite complex. Given fixed 
domestic grain supplies, it is no coincidence that a bulge during any one year 
in grain exports is closely tied to a similar period of food price increases. 
Exports will tend to increase rapidly when world food supplies become short. 
Since U.S. food prices are influenced in part by changes ln export demands, 
consumer interest groups are most concerned about U.S. export policy. 
Sporadic increases in demand may result in quite drastic price changes. 
This makes the farm management decisions more difficult because of price uncer-
tainties. At the very least, rapid grain price changes affect the livestock 
and poultry feeders plan in a given period. In turn, these repercussions 
influence the decisions and plans of breeders, cow-calf operators, and suppliers 
of products used in the livestock industry. 
Labor also feels impelled to influence grain trade policies in order 
to protect their johs in loading and shipping grain from this country. This is 
much like farmers •.rying to protect their markets and income when trade export 
restrictions are enrorced or import restrictions are lifted. Many Americans 
~ave serious reservations about any policy which may assist a major adversary 
in the world power struggle. Others believe that food exports may be used as a 
bargaining tool to achieve concessions from an adversary. Because of the short 
run economic and political effects, grain export policies have an impact on 
consumers, grain farmers, livestock farmers, labor and American shipping interests, 
marketing firms, and the political process. 
Trade Agreements With the USSR 
Perhaps a closer look at a negotiated trade agreement would be useful. 
The USSR grain trade agreement has numerous features: 
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1) The primary objective is to encourage a country, like Russia, which has 
an erratic record in grain produced from year to year, to bear some of the costs 
of stockpiling imports during years of good harvests to be used when weather 
extremes cause a short crop. 
2) It is a "gentlemen's" agreement, not a sales contract. All sales must 
be consummated annually by private firms in the grain trade. Farmers' organizations 
do have the opportunity to become more directly involved in grain export sales. 
3) There is an escape clause built into the agreement. The USSR has 
agreed to buy at least six million metric tons of U.S. corn and wheat from U.S. 
commercial firms in each of the five years beginning October 1, 1976 and ending 
September 30, 1981. In addition, the USSR has the option of buying an additional 
two million metric tons during each 12-month period. 
The forecast for the 1975-76 year for U.S. grain supply is close to 
263 million metric tons. The escape clause allows the U.S. government to reduce 
the quantity available for purchase in any year when supplies are forecast below 
the 225 million metric ton level. Should the U.S. want to export, or the USSR 
want to purchase more than eight million metric tons of wheat and corn in any 
one year, both governments must agree on the size of the additional shipments. 
4) Cash sales for all grain purchases are at prevailing market prices. 
In addition, the transactions must be spaced as evenly as possible over the 12-
month period to minimize grain price fluctuations. 
5) The agreement forbids the USSR to re-export U.S. grain to other 
countries. However, there are not restrictions on export shipments of USSR 
grain to other countries. 
6) The agreement is not legally binding. 
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7) In return for the Russian purchase agreement for wheat and corn, the 
U.S. has agreed not to impose any ~tlexpected export controls on these negotiated 
exports to the USSR. Barley, oats, rye, rice, and soybeans are not covered 
by the agreement and can be sold to the USSR without advance notice. 
8) The agreement provides for a portion of the Russian purchases to be 
transported in American ships at $16 per metric ton. AL.hough this shipping 
rate is above the world shipping rate, it is below the current U.S. shipping 
cost. Thus, the U.S. government is subsidizing the U.S. shipping industry--not 
the grain farmer or trade. It is estimated that subsidies to the shipping 
industry will average $30 million per year for the next five years. 
Consequences of Trade Agreements With the USSR 
Trade agreements are not new to the USSR. Since the early 1950's, Soviets 
were signing trade agreements with their Communist bloc trading partners. This 
was deemed necessary for centralized planning. Without trade agreements, the 
economic planners ·-,re unable to coordinate domestic and foreign production and 
consumption pattern . Although the USSR may incur additional costs from storing 
grain from surplus years to deficit years, overall costs may decline as their 
economic planning errors are reduced. 
With few exceptions (sugar and coffee agreements), the U.S. heretofore 
has not entered into bi-lateral trade agreements with other countries. The 
decentralized production and marketing system (private enterprise) has operated 
without such agreements. Since historic empirical evidence is limited, one can 
only theorize how the future economic consequences of these agreements may 
affect the U.S. economy. 
Presently concluded trade agreements with the USSR, eastern European 
countries, and Japan account for one-third of the U.S. exports of corn and 
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wheat. The trade agreement with the USSR accounts for about only 25% of the 
total tonnage covered by all trade agreements. The trade agreement with Japan 
provides for the export of about 2-1/2 times the tonnage of crop products of 
the USSR agreement. Japan's year-to-year purchases have shown much more stability 
in tonnage of grain and soybeans purchased than has the USSR (Tables 1 and 2). 
One objective of the grain agreement with countries with erratic purchases 
from year to year (like the USSR) is to encourage those countries to stockpile 
a reserve of grain during years when they have adequate grain harvests and draw 
on these stockpiles in years when their crops are limited. 
The effect of these agreements on U.S. price of grain in any one year 
is difficult to predict. The effect on U.S. food prices is also difficult to 
determine. The total U.S. domestic demand for grain is fairly stable. World 
demand is growing. World grain reserves from one crop year to another are 
presently very low. 
In this situation, if major production failures occur around the world, 
the price impact of such short crops is very significant, with or without trade 
agreements. Countries having trade agreements for U.S. grain in times of short 
supplies and rising prices will exercise all their options, probably early in 
the crop marketing year--providing price strength for the grain crops throughout 
the year. In turn, the U.S. may exercise its option to restrict the amount 
exported to protect domestic needs. In this instance, trade agreements may 
indeed restrict the quantity of grain that might be exported from that crop. 
Consequently, the grain farmers incomes are reduced, the cost to livestock farmers 
is reduced, and consumers pay lower prices for food. However, such restrictions 
could be put into effect with or without grain agreements. 
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On the other hand, in years when world grain production is adequate for 
world needs, or in excess of world ~eeds, trade agreements may act as a stabilizer 
for U.S. grain exports as importing nations exercise their minimum level of the 
grain agreements commitments and stockpile grain in that year for future lean 
periods. This action would increase the income to grain f3rmers, increase the 
cost to livestock farmers, and increase prices paid by C<-<lsumers. 
The long term effect of trade agreements on the average price of corn and 
wheat over a period of years is probably not great. However, if future trade 
agreements or other types of trade policies restrict grain exports, U.S. and 
world incomes and growth patterns will be reduced. For example, any policy 
which decreases export demand could temporarily dampen grain prices in the U.S. 
Initially, grain farmers will reduce production. If losses are occurring, the 
inefficient producer will go out of business. In short, resources once used to 
produce grain will become idle or will be used to produce other goods and services. 
Because of the decrease in grain production and grain export, imports of 
relatively cheap g,,ods and services will also decrease. Resources once used to 
produce grain may be used to produce these goods and services. Since world 
~esources are not being allocated optimally or used to their best comparative 
advantage, prices of the goods will most likely increase above their previous 
levels. 
The resulting shift of resources from grain production to other uses implies 
that fewer goods and services will be available to the U.S. consumer. Without 
a reduction in the money supply and with a smaller commodity bundle, inflation 
will exist. If the money supply is reduced, or if the appropriate fiscal policy 
is adopted, the number of unemployed will grow. Indeed, if future trade agreements 
restrict grain flows, inflation will occur, the number of unemployed will increase, 
and/or world resources will be misallocated. 
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On the other hand, it is difficult to empirically document that either 
the short run embargo last fall (a definite trade restriction) or the previous 
1974 embargo had a detrimental effect on prices in the U.S. Grain prices are 
world prices, not U.S. prices. If, indeed, Russia purchased Brazilian soybeans 
instead of U.S. soybeans during the short embargo of last autumn, the price 
effect would be exactly the same. Thus, it is difficult to restrict trade with 
any type of trade policy. 
Summary 
An increase in grain exports, by itself, is not inflationary. To both the 
nation imposing the controls and to the world community, trade restrictions such 
as import levies, export subsidies, quotas, and licenses, usually have costs which 
exceed the benefits of the trade restrictions. Current grain trade agreements 
have not imposed substantial barriers to trade, but such trade policies could well 
interfere with the free flow of products between nation as these agreements are 
extended to other nations. The recent trade agreements should shift some of the 
risk (and costs) of holding grain reserves to nations with erratic production 
and weather records. Who will benefit from this shift of risk is an unknown. 
Unanswered questions include: Do these present grain agreements establish a 
precedent for future political international commodity agreements?; Will these 
agreements tend to take on trade restrictive features over time as almost certain 
adjustments are made?; Will free trade strengthen the "hand" of our adversaries?; 
What are the "trade offs" that may come to pass as trade and political objectives 
collide in the international arenas? 
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A % of 
Production 
Eastern 
Western S.C. & N. Europe 
Euro Ee America3 Asia4 JaEan China & USSR USSR Other Total 
1974-751 14664.7 3083.3 1139. 6 5088.6 23.4 2815.6 1164.6 1687.0 28502.2 24.0 
1973-741 14430.6 3077. 7 1239.l 6975.7 1758.6 4798.4 4045.6 2591. 2 34871. 3 20.0 
1972-731 12882.2 2457.1 1588.7 5588.2 840.8 4399.4 3273.6 1158.8 28915.2 12.0 
1971-721 8822.5 1465.0 1101. 9 2533.2 -- 2450.3 1603.2 424.9 16797.8 12.0 
19712 6961. 2 1262.5 768.1 2420.0 -- 1227.4 200.4 259.3 12898.5 12.0 
19702 7146. 7 1972. 8 546.5 4192.4 -- 264.0 -- 261.7 14384.1 13.0 
19692 6897.3 2131.1 445.3 3657.4 -- 564.7 -- 256.0 13951. 8 11. 7 
SOURCE: U.S. Foreign Agricultural Trade Statistical Report, 1975-76. Economic Research Service, U.S.D.A. 
1Fiscal Year 
2calendar Year 
3Transhipments not deleted 
4noes not include Japan and China 
TABLE 2 
U.S. WHEAT EXPORTS TO SELECTED REGIONS, 1969-1975 
000 MT 
Export as 
------------------------------------------g~E~E!~---------------------------------------- A % of Year Production 
Eastern 
Western S.C. & N. Europe 
EuroEe America3 Asia4 JaEan China & USSR USSR Other Total 
1974-751 2451.7 4166.5 14898.9 3079.0 1495.8 1102.3 . 978 -- 27194.2 67.0 
1973-741 2283.1 5451.8 7868.3 3052.0 2993.8 3541.3 2716.4 4871.4 30061. 7 77 .0 
1972-731 2882.0 4711.5 6977. 6 3372. 0 -- 10564.6 9369.5 2324.6 30832.3 39.0 
1971-721 1847.2 3545.4 6212.4 2186.7 -- 33.7 2.8 1851.4 15676.0 47.0 
19712 2238.5 2828.1 4330.7 1987.6 -- 576.3 2.1 1041.8 13003.0 54.C 
19702 3201.6 3365.4 6595.7 2758.6 -- 151.8 -- 1364.3 17437.4 42.0 
19692 1490.3 2979.9 4685.8 2030.1 -- -- -- 901.7 12087.8 38.4 




3Transhipments not deleted 
4noes not include Japan and China 
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